



Introduction

Just as Europe is experiencing a new wave of infections in the midst of the ongoing Coronavirus pandemic, the European Commission and the Member States have begun to draw initial lessons. The response at EU level is one that emphasises the need for closer cross-border cooperation. In her State of the Union Address, President von der Leyen announced that “**we need to build a stronger European Health Union**”. Among the measures that she proposed, one was the creation of a European agency for biomedical advanced research and development (an EU BARDA). This new agency would support the EU’s capacity and readiness to respond to cross-border threats and emergencies, incl. CBRN – whether of natural or deliberate origin.

At working level, DG HOME recently organised a meeting of the **CBRN Advisory Group**. While the pandemic was one of the main topics discussed, the meeting was also an opportunity to look more broadly at different ways to improve **European biosecurity**. This very interactive meeting showed that there is strong support for more European action in this area.



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As this newsletter is a community product, we welcome any suggestions/feedback regarding content as well as proposals as to additional content that might be included in future editions of the newsletter, i.e. news about recent or upcoming events, developments at national level, etc. Please send any proposed content to HOME-CBRN-AG@ec.europa.eu

CBRN ADVISORY GROUP MEETING – 19 OCTOBER 2020

The ongoing **Coronavirus pandemic** – whilst not an example of an intentional release of a biological agent – amply illustrates the potential consequences of a successfully executed bioterrorist attack.

The CBRN Advisory Group meeting was a good opportunity to launch an initial discussion on the lessons that have been learned thus far, but also to have a closer look at the **European biosecurity framework**. The Commission tasked a consortium of Member States experts, led by the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM), to map the current situation and propose a set of tools to improve biosecurity in the EU. The conclusions from this work were presented during the meeting.

The **online meeting** was attended by close to **70 participants** from almost all Member States, the European Institutions as well as – for the relevant points – Interpol and members of the aforementioned consortium. During the first half of the meeting, Commission services (DG SANTE and DG ECHO) and Interpol presented their activities in responding to the pandemic as well as their plans for the near-term future. Like other meeting participants, Interpol's assessment is that **while the immediate threat of bioterrorism has not increased, it might over the longer term**. In depicting their own responses at national level, Member States described certain challenges, including ones related to cross-sectoral cooperation, achieving effective cross-sectoral crisis management approaches, and personal protective equipment (PPE) (availability, knowledge about appropriate use).


During the latter half of the meeting, a consortium of Member State authorities presented the results of its research into the **biosecurity situation in the EU**. The consortium found that there is no coherent EU-wide framework for biosecurity, but rather consists of a patchwork of national measures and approaches. Some Member States have well developed legal frameworks, while others have only some relevant provisions included in national biosafety regulations. The **biosecurity toolbox** that the consortium developed for the Commission contains 60 existing resources in different formats (books, checklists, codes, databases, guidance and best practices, legislation, interactive tools, training manuals, courses, etc.). Apart from these existing tools, the consortium developed new ones, e.g. for the assessment of insider threat.

In looking to the future, the consortium recommended the creation of a **European biosecurity platform** with delegates from all EU Member States. The aim of such a platform would be to foster the coordinated development with the support of Member States of policies, guidelines and tools required to address identified gaps in biosecurity capabilities. The subsequent discussion revealed **strong support for further work at EU level on biosecurity**.

The next meeting of the CBRN Advisory Group is scheduled for early spring 2021.

ISF-Police projects

RESIST - RESilience Support for critical Infrastructures for Standardised Training on CBRN



Operators of public spaces and Critical Infrastructures (CI) are more and more confronted with varied types of events, natural and man-made, threatening the functioning of the infrastructure, the security of its operators and the general public. In this frame, CBRN events are gaining relevance due to their potentially disruptive impact on the availability and provision of basic services for the public and/or the safety of end-users themselves.

RESIST will engage public-private operators of CIs in the set-up and testing of the first 10 CBRN intervention groups, trained and equipped to operate in contaminated environments.

The entire process will set up the basis for the proposal of a voluntary certification valid at the EU level for public and private operators, namely the CBRN Resilience Label.



ISF-Police projects

RESIST - PILOT TRAINING & SIMULATION

As part of RESIST project activities, project partners with the special support of the Joint Defence NBC School in Rieti, Corpo Nazionale Vigili del Fuoco (Italian National Fire Department) and University of Rome Tor Vergata have organized and successfully delivered a 5-days training culminating with the execution of a real-life CBRNe simulation.

The first pilot course targeted 18 participants from **Rete Ferroviaria Italiana** and **Trenitalia** with the goal of testing the operational guidelines produced under WP3 and familiarizing CIs personnel with PPE and relevant procedures. The pilot training and simulation took place at the Joint Defence NBC School of Rieti (Italy), NUBICH training area and involved both theory classes and one simulation, which involved a CBRN event in a train convoy and recognition of a reconnaissance of sewage system.

At the end of the training cycle, which will continue in 2021 with the first 4 courses of the new year kicking off in January, 100 participants from public and private CIs' operators will gain the technical know-how and knowledge to accurately perform key CBRN procedures for smoother coordination and cooperation with first responders, let alone more effective safeguarding of the critical infrastructure and therefore enhanced preparedness and response.



Open-source review

A selection of CBRN-related news from the past months follows.

The Commission neither endorses nor takes responsibility for the content of the articles.

- **Ricin letters to President Trump**

<https://nationalpost.com/news/world/first-look-at-poison-letter-to-trump-return-address-on-ricin-envelope-leads-right-to-quebec-apartment>

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/canadian-woman-accused-of-mailing-ricin-letter-threatening-trump/2020/09/22/b9b944ca-fc12-11ea-9ceb-061d646d9c67_story.html

- **Navalny's Novichok poisoning**

<https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/02/europe/alexey-navalny-novichok-russia-analysis-intl/index.html>

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43377698>

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/world/europe/navalny-opcw-russia-novichok.html>

- **Bacterial outbreak infects thousands after factory leak in China**

<https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/17/asia/china-brucellosis-outbreak-intl-hnk/index.html>

<https://www.thedailystar.net/world/news/report-china-lab-leak-infects-thousands-bacterial-disease-1963701>



- Free photo 5036617 © Oleg Pidodnya - Dreamstime.com

European CBRN policy refresher ...

Bengt Skotheim, Norwegian Directorate of Health

Joint Action TERROR – to strengthen health preparedness and response to biological and chemical terror attacks

For which there are two key objectives:

- Address gaps in health preparedness**
- Strengthen cross-sectoral work (health, security & civil protection sectors)**

Cross-sectoral collaboration is key. A strong working relationships and coordination between health, civil protection and law enforcement is essential to responding effectively to a terrorist incident involving biological or chemical agents. There are several EU projects and programmes that are, or have been, working to address biological and chemical terror threats. This is clearly positive.

However, more must still needs to be done when it comes to cross-sectoral collaboration and information sharing. The COVID-19 crisis alone has further brought to the fore the benefits - but also the challenges - in implementing this type of collaboration.

The Joint Action has already attracted a strong technical consortium from across Europe (18 countries participating), including health experts, as well as colleagues from DG HOME, DG ECHO and DG SANTE to ensure guidance from the relevant sectors. Our aim is to make this work sustainable, with tangible output that serves to better link our sectors and provide practical guidance for our collaboration. In turn, we are working to protect our citizens and our societies from the disastrous and far-reaching impacts of a chemical or biological terror attack.

As the Joint Action begins its work in 2021, this serves as an additional **call to members and actors of the civil protection and law enforcement community to join in on the work and collaborate on projects** that bring our sectors together to ensure better preparedness and response. Your participation and involvement in the Joint Action's upcoming workshops, networking, surveys and table-tops is actively encouraged and welcomed!


The Commission's and the participating countries' expectations and rationale for the Joint Action TERROR is clear: support the Union with tangible and practical resources to improve health sector readiness and cross sectoral preparedness and response to be able to respond effectively and efficiently to a biological and chemical terror attack.

We ask you: is your country prepared for a biological and chemical terror attack? Is the Union prepared?

Increased participation and engagement from the civil protection and the law enforcement sectors is still needed! Please reach out via the contact details below for more information.

Contact information: The Norwegian Directorate of Health, Bengt Skotheim, Bictra@helsedir.no

EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative



C B R N

**Centres
of Excellence**

An initiative of the European Union

Labplus Africa (Project 85) is active in the African Partner Countries to the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence programme to counter COVID-19 spread

Large-scale epidemics are becoming more and more frequent and constitute a health, economic, social and security threat. Resource-limited, at-risk settings are most vulnerable to the burden and amplification of epidemics — particularly in Africa.

Mobile labs may be particularly useful in responding to epidemics such as COVID-19, because as far as sound prerequisite conditions are fulfilled, they can be mobilised quickly, can provide a flexible response which responds to local needs. The costs of their deployment include the one-off costs as well as the ongoing costs (staff recruitment, retention, ongoing training, utilities, power, water, waste treatment & disposal, maintenance, servicing, calibration, repair and replacement of equipment, consumables and reagents, ...).

All these mandatory conditions being fulfilled thanks to the [Institut Pasteur global network](#) (including Institut Pasteur Dakar) and the relevant network of [African Health Institutes](#), the Mobile Labs can also be easily integrated into and interoperable with local and regional systems. The current project Labplus Africa (Project 85) relies on successful previous test case (see the article "[Praesens Foundation, Institut Pasteur, Institut Pasteur de Dakar, University of Nebraska Medical Center, Twist Bioscience Consortium Win Prix Galien MedStartUp Award](#)")

The European Union teamed up with the [International Science and Technology Centre, Pasteur Institute Senegal](#) and [Praesens Care](#) to provide health assistance using mobile labs to help tackle the COVID-19 crisis.

This involves adapting the activities of the EU-funded Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, and activating this network to adopt mitigation measures to slow the spread of the virus.

Source: https://europa.eu/cbrn-risk-mitigation/cbrn-coe-labplus-africa-project-85-contributes-counter-covid-19-2020-10-01_en

Member States' perspective

Janez Češarek, Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) Slovenia

Nuclear security and RN-related part within CBRN (a few Slovene headwords)

Threat assessment in the nuclear sphere is a national responsibility and even the EU countries have various approaches. While IAEA recommendations and guides give a kind of umbrella, each country – more or less maturely – specifies and conducts this cyclic process with their national stakeholders, being sometimes quite numerous. Some elements of such an assessment could be even public but all the details are clearly confidential. IAEA issued a useful document, namely the [Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat](#) (NSS no. 10) to guide the Member States.

While threats can vary greatly (also having in mind, 'beyond design basis threat' which are primarily states' care), usual life in the regulator's office is flavoured by a bunch of low low-level threats and issues. Regional perspective is important and 'events' may be unique (not omitting those cases which stretched through different continents in the past). Some past or recent issues abroad have included even contaminated gambling items, contaminated banknotes, 'radioactive' pendants and gadgets, 'boothuis'-type of collectors of radioactive items and antiques etc. Ultimately, the inspection control with 'boots-on-the-ground' can unveil also many individual cases and it is imperative to use a graded approach, *cum grano salis*, while the legislation and regulation should be clear, coherent and evolving over the time. Open source information and meticulous browsing do require quite some time; one of the good referential sources is also the Global Incidents and Trafficking Database (CSN, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies). Additional, deeper insights are surely enabled through the [IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database](#) (ITDB) which is of course not a public set of data. ITDB should be seen more as a 'weather-vane' due to the fact that nearly 4000 reporting events vary a lot – from those with trafficking and malicious intent to those which include low-level radioactively contaminated materials.

Recently, so-called [Nuclear Security Index](#) has been issued again, assessing and ranging majority of the countries worldwide into two groups vis-à-vis potential theft of nuclear material, sabotage on nuclear facilities as well as describing countries' efforts to protect radioactive material. The placements of the EU countries have been excellent or quite good for some of us. From this 'mirror', everybody could resume some actions to improve nuclear security and 'resilience' regarding RN. This could include different subsets, e.g. security culture, (further) capacity building, insider threat (prevention), extra international efforts and funding etc.

Detection of radiation and smuggled radioactive material (including nuclear) at the nodal point or border has received a salient impetus in the last two decade. Discovered orphan sources in scrap and at major ports are well known and frequently published or addressed, also within the global expert community (recent discoveries e.g. in the Netherlands and Germany; Co-60). A bit different are those global cases where detection and seizure(s) occur at the airports. Sometimes wrapped in a mystery and secrecy also for the reason of security. But it is important to better share good practices, lessons-learned and case studies in this regard, as much as possible within the EU. Slovenia has recently bolstered its regulatory framework with the "[Decree on checking the radioactivity of consignments that could contain orphan sources](#)" which endeavours to cover radiation safety and security aspects, extending obligations also to e.g. domestic airports and major port.

Member States' perspective (continued)

Safety - security nexus has considerably grown in its importance in the last two decades. Nuclear safety and nuclear security have a common purpose, i.e. the protection of people, society and the environment. Many of the principles to ensure protection are common and they serve to enhance both safety and security, simultaneously. However, there are also certain circumstances in which actions to serve one objective can be antagonistic to the achievement of the other. Two international documents are useful in this vein, the "[Report Interfaces between Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security](#)" (issued by WENRA, 2019) as well as "[The Interface Between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants](#)" (issued by IAEA, as INSAG-24, back in 2010). Safety - security interface is not relevant only for nuclear facilities and approaches there but also e.g. in case of transport of nuclear or radioactive material. Within EU, ADR plays the main role (and other modal agreements too). High consequence dangerous goods, in this case radioactive material, shall be adequately protected during safe transport. The forthcoming edition of ADR will not bring any major breakthrough in this regard – but some smaller ones, e.g. in 8.5, S21 (a clearer language on the supervision in accordance with the security plan).

Some countries have been more pro-active in pursuing alternative technologies instead of employing radioactive sources, in particular high-activity ones. The overarching principle of 'justification of a radiation practice' is present as well as one of the pillars of risk management, i.e. reducing the potential consequences by removing the 'target' – where possible and reasonable. In Slovenia, we have seen a quite steady use of high-activity radioactive sources in industrial radiography or brachytherapy. Other sources, like 'historical' radioactive lightning arrestors have been prohibited and there has been a slight decline in the use of ionising smoke detectors.

There are some attractive and important international initiative of like-minded countries, originated from the off-spring of the Nuclear Security Summits. They are also published by the IAEA through the INFCIRC series. In 2018, Slovenia decided to endorse to 'Joint Statements' – namely INFCIRC/910 (on strengthening the security of high activity sealed radioactive source) and INFCIRC/918 (on countering nuclear smuggling). This can be seen as our platform to further demonstrate due commitments to stronger RN-related approaches and nuclear security regime, nationally and in a wider grasp.

Awareness raisings about RN-issues and a sustainable nuclear security should be a never-ending story, pursued by the tireless regulators in this domain. The audience is varied, from customs officers to safety advisers on dangerous goods, from police to the staff in nuclear facilities and facilities, holding radioactive material. This may entail *ad hoc* short seminars or periodic, e.g. annual sessions of stakeholders. For the latter, there are two groups in Slovenia to be mentioned in passing: one, dealing with prevention of illicit trafficking of radioactive material and the second, addressing safe (and secure) transport of radioactive material.

Small countries and small-scale regulators are sometimes in an unenviable situation – comparing them with their larger neighbours or global power-horses. It should be wise to looking at things from the bird's perspective and frequently also threats and risks are (fortunately) different, i.e. normally less significant or substantial. However, there is no room for a complacency to follow RN issues in a sustainable manner.

Internal Security Fund support for implementation of Luxembourg CBRN policy

The text on the next few pages, prepared by the **Luxembourg** Police, describes activities undertaken in this Member State aiming to implement the 2017 EU CBRN Action Plan. These activities were partially financed through the Internal Security Fund Police.

The **Internal Security Fund** (ISF) was set up for the period 2014-2020, with a total of EUR 3.8 billion for the seven years. The Fund promotes the implementation of the Internal Security Strategy, law enforcement cooperation and the management of the Union's external borders. The ISF is composed of two instruments, ISF Borders and Visa and ISF Police.

General implementation mechanisms of the ISF Police

Overall, there are two main implementation modes of the ISF Police:

Union Actions: part of the ISF Police fund is implemented by the Commission through Union Actions, which include Calls for Proposals, procurement, direct awards and delegation agreements. For these actions, the Commission approves Annual Work Programmes that define the priorities and objectives for each year, including the priorities for the Calls for Proposals. Projects such as Resist (pages 3-4 of this newsletter), Mall-CBRN, Transtun and Melody (presented in previous editions) fall in this category.

National Programmes: most of the ISF Police fund is implemented by EU Member States through national programmes on the basis of multiannual programming.

The activities described by Luxembourg were included in their ISF National Programme. The Luxembourgish text aims both to keep you abreast of activities implemented at national level and to inspire you to share information about activities taking place in your Member States.

Moreover, the budget of the Internal Security Fund in the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework will most likely be even higher. The programming phase is ongoing, so now is the moment to include your ideas in the National Programmes for the period 2021-2027.

Internal Security Fund – National Programmes

Léon Ludovicy, Luxembourg Police

F5Le projet CBRN cofinancé par le Fonds pour la Sécurité intérieure, programme national du Luxembourg

Introduction

Tenant compte de la menace terroriste telle qu'elle s'est présentée au cours des dernières années en Europe et de l'analyse de la menace en matière de CBRN-E (chimique, biologique, radiologique, nucléaire, explosifs) effectuée au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg par le Service de renseignement, le Conseil de Gouvernement avait chargé le Haut-Commissariat à la Protection nationale d'entamer des travaux de coordination pour l'élaboration d'un plan d'intervention d'urgence (PIU) en cas d'attaque par des substances CBRN en y impliquant tous les ministères, administrations et services étatiques concernés. Même si à ce moment, il existait différents dispositifs spécifiques pour réagir à un incident accidentel ou intentionnel impliquant des substances CBRN, une planification nationale sous forme d'un plan d'intervention d'urgence définissant l'action gouvernementale en cas d'incident impliquant des substances CBRN faisait défaut.

L'élaboration du plan s'est également inscrit dans le contexte du paquet « contre-terrorisme » que la Commission européenne avait présenté en date du 18 octobre 2017. Ce paquet comporte, entre autres, un plan d'action qui a pour objet d'améliorer la préparation aux risques CBRN en demandant aux États membres de garantir une meilleure capacité de réaction à ces incidents. La Commission européenne souligne en effet dans son paquet « contre-terrorisme » que des éléments solides indiquent que des groupes terroristes pourraient avoir l'intention de se procurer des matières ou des armes CBRN. La Commission européenne s'est référée dans son paquet à l'analyse d'Interpol qui considère que DAESH est en mesure de produire et d'utiliser des armes chimiques et que des incidents de moindre ampleur (notamment au Maroc) auraient montré l'intérêt de DAESH envers l'innovation et le développement d'armes radiologiques et biologiques.

Le plan d'intervention d'urgence CBRN

Le plan d'intervention d'urgence se greffe sur le plan gouvernemental de vigilance nationale face aux menaces d'actions terroristes (plan VIGILNAT) et définit plus précisément l'action du Gouvernement en cas d'attaque par des substances CBRN. Il a été adopté par le Conseil de Gouvernement en date du 1^{er} juin 2018.

Il est déclenché lorsque le niveau de la menace est fixé, en application du plan VIGILNAT, à un niveau 3 ou 4 et qu'une menace terroriste impliquant des substances CBRN semble :

- vraisemblable et concrète (niveau 3)
- imminente ou a été commise sur le territoire national (niveau 4)

Le plan détermine la procédure d'alerte ainsi que les personnes et organes qui interviennent au niveau de la gestion de la crise. Il précise ensuite les mesures à mettre en œuvre en cas d'incident CBRN. Étant donné que le PIU CBRN se greffe sur le plan VIGILNAT, les mesures en question sont

Internal Security Fund – National Programmes (continued)

spécifiques à la thématique CBRN et doivent être considérées comme complémentaires aux mesures définies par le plan VIGILNAT. Ces mesures spécifiques visent notamment

- la mise en en alerte du Laboratoire national de santé ;
- les actions à mettre en œuvre par les premiers intervenants sur le site ;
- la mise en place de différentes zones autour du lieu de l'incident;
- l'accueil hospitalier en cas d'attaque chimique, biologique ou radiologique ;
- l'assistance internationale dans le cadre d'attaques chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucléaires ;
- les mesures de santé publique à mettre en œuvre (recommandations à la population, distribution d'antibiotiques ou d'antidotes, vaccination de masse...).

Impact budgétaire

L'équipement nécessaire pour assurer la mise en œuvre du plan d'intervention d'urgence a fait l'objet de nombreuses réunions avec les différents acteurs afin de rechercher des synergies au niveau de l'acquisition et de l'utilisation du matériel qui est nécessaire pour faire face à ce type d'évènement. L'acquisition du matériel et la préparation des services pour répondre efficacement à un tel incident se sont étalées sur une période de deux à trois ans. Cette phase a débuté en 2019 et est toujours en cours d'implémentation.



Internal Security Fund – National Programmes (continued)

Les estimations budgétaires pour l'acquisition du matériel nécessaire pour mettre en œuvre les mesures inscrites dans le plan d'intervention d'urgence se sont présentées comme suit :

- Administration des services de secours : 2.413.000.- Euro
- Armée luxembourgeoise : 854.500.- Euro
- Direction de la Santé 3.227.313,11.- Euro
- Police grand-ducale 6.790.678.-Euro

L'impact budgétaire total a été être chiffré à 13.526.791,11.- Euro. Ce montant a été mis à disposition par le Gouvernement luxembourgeois sur la période budgétaire 2019-2021. S'y ajoute un montant de 1.000.000.- Euro cofinancé par le Fonds pour la Sécurité intérieure.

Le projet CBRN est son implémentation au sein de la Police Grand-Ducale

La finalité du projet était de préparer la Police Grand-Ducale en concertation avec les autres acteurs comme les services de secours aussi bien matériellement qu'opérationnellement à tous les risques et menaces d'origine CBRN, qu'ils soient de cause accidentelle ou émanent d'un acte malveillant. Le projet s'est décline en 5 phases :

Phase 1 :

Une analyse détaillée de toutes les missions à remplir par la Police Grand-Ducale en cas d'un incident CBRN a relevé entre autres les défis suivants :

- l'installation et la sécurisation des périmètres de sécurité,
- la sécurisation des missions des services de secours et de soins,
- la sécurisation d'une mesure de quarantaine,
- l'organisation de l'évacuation de la population,
- la prise de mesures de mise à l'abri et de confinement des produits dangereux,
- la sécurisation des lieux sensibles et le contrôle aux frontières,
- la détection et la neutralisation d'engins explosifs improvisés (EEI) associés à un agent CBRN,
- la gestion administrative et judiciaire de personnes potentiellement contaminées,
- l'information à la population et la gestion de la psychologie sociale
- l'assistance à la décontamination des personnes et des matériels.
- la sécurisation des lieux sensibles et le contrôle aux frontières,
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- l'information à la population et la gestion de la psychologie sociale
- l'assistance à la décontamination des personnes et des matériels.

Internal Security Fund – National Programmes (continued)

Phase 2 :

Afin de se préparer à ces nombreux défis, une doctrine complète CBRN a été élaborée qui se présente sous forme de deux documents:

1) Un guide opérationnel d'interaction CBRN décrivant sans complexité tous les points techniques à connaître avant d'engager des moyens humains et matériels sur une situation de nature CBRN. Ce guide permet à la Police Grand-Ducale de structurer ses ressources humaines et matérielles et de consolider sa capacité d'intervention en milieu contaminé en décrivant précisément tous les protocoles qui devront faire l'objet de formations, d'entraînements et d'exercices et couvre les aspects suivants : les types de tenues distinctes nécessaires pour remplir les différentes missions dévolues à la Police, le besoin en équipements spécialisés (moyens de décontamination, appareils de protection respiratoire, etc.), la gestion des engagements humains en tenant compte des précautions médicales et du suivi après intervention, les synergies possibles avec les autres acteurs sur le terrain (services de secours, service de la radioprotection, service médicaux, etc.), les aspects logistiques (stockage, transport et distribution), la vérification des spécifications d'emploi (péremptions, résistance au type d'agent R, B ou C), les modalités de prise en compte des personnels contaminés ou susceptibles de l'être, les modalités de prise en compte des matériels consommables, sensibles et/ou traitables (décontamination des armes, des appareils de détection, etc.), la gestion des déchets contaminés, les modalités de gestion des prélèvements le cas échéant, la description des interactions avec les acteurs non policiers et la conséquence sur l'engagement des moyens humains et matériels, le niveau de formation à détenir pour l'emploi des matériels spécifiques CBRN et des procédures de travail.

2) Des fiches tactiques par mission qui proposent une description exhaustive des protocoles d'engagement des ressources en fonction des situations possibles, des missions à remplir et des activités à réaliser. Ces fiches tactiques abordent méthodiquement, en fonction des situations et des missions à remplir, les éléments essentiels comme la définition de l'objectifs de la mission, l'inventaire des activités à réaliser, l'organisation des opérations en déterminant l'autorité responsable et en identifiant les contraintes, l'engagement des moyens et des ressources humaines en tenant compte des facteurs limitants comme la gêne occasionnée par le port de l'équipement, les problèmes de communication sous les masques à gaz et le comportement des victimes et du public en face à une situation CBRN, la gestion des moyens post-engagements comme la gestion des déchets et l'analyse après action.

Phase 3 :

Élaboration d'un cahier des charges d'investissement CBRN.

Évaluation des quantités de matériels à acquérir selon des critères opérationnels et logistiques.

Établissement des spécifications des différents matériaux CBRN à acheter.

Organisation du matériel en lots afin de minimiser les problèmes d'interfaces entre les différents composants (tenues, gants, masque à gaz, etc.)

Internal Security Fund – National Programmes (continued)

Phase 4 :

Acquisition du matériel CBRN sur base des différents cahiers des charges d'investissement CBRN.

Phase 5 :

L'organisation de la formation et des exercices au sein de la Police Grand-Ducale et en collaboration avec les autres administrations étatiques concernées.

À ce stade, la mise en œuvre du projet CBRN au sein de la Police Grand-Ducale se situe au niveau des phases 4 et 5. La majorité des acquisitions a été finalisée et les formations et exercices sont en cours de finalisation.



Présentation d'un cas concret d'acquisition de matériel CBRN. - Dispositif de neutralisation d'engins explosifs.

Dans le contexte d'une menace à la bombe, le désamorçage d'un engin explosif s'avère souvent très difficile et constitue un risque énorme pour le démineur et son entourage.

Dans un tel cas de figure, les démineurs se rendent sur le lieu de la mission munis d'un équipement spécifique composé d'un camion transportant le matériel et pouvant tracter un conteneur à bombes. Ce système de sécurisation mobile, utilisé pour transporter et neutraliser des engins explosifs, est composé d'une chambre étanche montée sur une remorque. Dans un scénario CBRN, un système externe de décontamination peut être couplé à ce dispositif, manié par un service spécialisé en la matière.

Internal Security Fund – National Programmes (continued)

Les manutentions sur place sont confiées à un robot de déminage contrôlé à distance. Ce dernier place l'engin explosif à l'intérieur de la chambre aux fins de neutralisation moyennant une explosion contrôlée.

L'acquisition de ce seul dispositif de neutralisation a été budgétisée à 915.635,15.- Euro, dont 480.769,23.- Euro ont été cofinancés par le Fond pour la Sécurité intérieure. La commande de cet équipement a été effectuée au mois de septembre 2018 et la livraison de l'ensemble du dispositif vient de se terminer.

La seule composante du container à bombes a été fabriquée en Suède auprès de la société Dynasafe spécialisée dans ce domaine. Petite anecdote dans le cadre de l'acheminement de cette composante vers le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. La livraison a dû être organisée à trois reprises. En effet, lors du premier essai, il a été constaté que la hauteur du timon du container à bombes ne correspondait pas à celle de la barre de remorquage du camion. La livraison n'a pas pu se faire en attendant le soudage du timon à la bonne hauteur. Quelques semaines plus tard lors du deuxième essai, il s'est avéré que le poids du container à bombes était trop élevé pour un remorquage vers Luxembourg. Finalement, lors du troisième essai, le container à bombes a pu être livré vers Luxembourg. Ce qui fait penser au proverbe « jamais deux sans trois ».

Conclusions

Le plan d'intervention d'urgence CBRN et son implémentation au niveau national respectivement au sein de la Police Grand-Ducale constituait un projet de longue haleine. La concertation avec les différentes administrations en matière de définition de la stratégie nationale et des standards au niveau des équipements à acquérir constituait un vrai défi.

En effet, l'acquisition des équipements spécifiques en matière de CBRN nécessitait une approche commune de toutes les administrations concernées. Une harmonisation au niveau du matériel était nécessaire afin de permettre des synergies en matière d'utilisation et de maintenance dudit équipement.

Le cofinancement par le Fonds pour la Sécurité intérieure n'a constitué que 10 pourcents des investissements totaux dans la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale en matière de CBRN. Mais, il y a lieu de souligner que cette mise à disposition de fonds par l'intermédiaire du budget européen a permis de relancer à tout moment les négociations en cours et de finaliser ce plan d'intervention d'urgence dans les meilleurs délais.